When does a trade relationship become a one-way street? We study bilateral trade balances for a set of 18 European economies over the period from 1948 through 2008. We find that trade imbalances among euro area members widened considerably with the introduction of the euro, even after allowing for permanent asymmetries in trade competitiveness within country pairs or in the overall trade competitiveness of individual countries. This is consistent with indications that trade imbalances tend to be smaller when nominal exchange rates are flexible. Much of the observed increase in intra-euro area imbalances can be traced to a higher degree of persistence, some of which is linked to labor market inflexibility. Reviewing the direction of imbalances, we find evidence that bilateral trade surpluses are decreasing in the real exchange rate, decreasing in growth differentials, and increasing in the relative volatility of national business cycles. Finally, countries with relatively higher fiscal deficits and less flexible labor and product markets show systematically lower trade surpluses than others. JEL Code: F15; F16; F32; F36; F42
I. Introduction
Imbalances in bilateral trade relationships have raised considerable interest recently. One prominent example is the trade deficit between the United States and China which increased from virtually zero in the mid 1980s to more than 225 billion US dollar in 2009, accounting for almost one half of the U.S. total trade deficit. Other examples are bilateral imbalances within the euro area. While the euro area traditionally shows a broadly balanced trade balance overall, the size of individual euro area member surpluses and deficits has significantly increased since the 1990s. Part of this development was the emergence of trade deficits of Southern European economies with other euro area countries.
While there is no economic reason to assume that a particular bilateral trade relationship should be balanced, the emergence of large and persistent trade imbalances could signal underlying rigidities or distortions. For example, protectionist measures can bias trade in favor of a particular country or delay the adjustment to shocks, and so can fixed or managed exchange rates that slow the adjustment of the real exchange rate. The lack of an adjustable nominal exchange rate could pose a particular problem within a currency union such as the euro area that operates a single and unrestricted market for goods and services. In this case, the permanently fixed nominal exchange rate forces real exchange rate adjustment trough relative price levels alone, which can be difficult in the presence of rigidities in national goods and labor markets. That said, the empirical evidence of the link between trade imbalances on the one hand and exchange rate flexibility and structural rigidities on the other is rather mixed (see Section 2).
The present paper identifies several stylized facts on intra-European trade that can add to this discussion. We study trade between a set of 18 European economies over the period from 1948 through 2008. Trade imbalances-measured as the absolute value of trade deficits and surpluses-between the subset of euro area member countries became considerably larger with the introduction of the euro even after controlling for fixed country-pair effects and timevariant common or country (reporter and partner) effects. This suggests that euro area imbalances are not only the result of enduring asymmetries in trade competitiveness between countries or the consequence of trends in the competitiveness of specific countries against all others. The finding that trade imbalances tend to be lower when nominal exchange rates are flexible points in the same direction. Much of the observed increase in intra-euro area imbalances can be traced to a higher degree of persistence, some of which is linked to labor market inflexibility. Turning to trade surpluses and deficits, we find evidence that bilateral trade surpluses are decreasing in the real exchange rate, decreasing in growth differentials, and increasing in the relative volatility of national business cycles. Finally, countries with relatively higher fiscal deficits and less flexible labor and product markets show systematically lower trade surpluses than others. Many of these effects on the direction of trade imbalances are particularly developed among euro area member countries. These findings entail both bad and good news for policymakers in the euro area. On the negative side, permanently fixed nominal exchange rates do come at the cost of large and lasting trade imbalances. On the plus side, these imbalances can be addressed through structural and macroeconomic policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data. We begin our analysis by examining the association between the exchange rate regime and trade imbalances (Section 4). We then explore various determinants of bilateral trade surpluses and deficits (Section 5) . Finally, we analyze the persistence in trade patterns (Section 6). Our findings are summarized in a brief concluding section which also provides some policy conclusions.
II. Related Literature
The question whether fixed exchange rates are an impediment to the adjustment of current account imbalances (or the underlying trade imbalances) is rarely new. Friedman (1953) famously claimed that flexible exchange rates would provide for continuous and rapid adjustment of relative prices and facilitate external adjustment. However, while the statement continues to have strong intuitive appeal, Chinn and Wei (2008) find little or no empirical difference in the persistence of current account surpluses or deficits under flexible or fixed exchange rates across countries and time, declaring Friedman's claim a matter of "faith." Ghosh and others (2008) , on the other hand, side with Friedman, citing evidence that the flexibility of nominal exchange rates facilitates the adjustment of real rates and trade flows, albeit perhaps in a non-linear fashion. A related question is whether the real exchange rate is a significant driver of trade-a relationship doubted, for example, by Rose (1990) but supported by Debelle and Faruque (1990) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) . The absence of "closure" to the debate (Ghosh and others, 2008) has created interest in the natural experiment provided by the introduction of the euro-with equally mixed results. The literature on the euro's trade effects provides indications that the absence of nominal exchange rate volatility fostered intra-euro area trade (Rose, 2000; Faruqee, 2004; Baldwin, 2006) , but the picture is complicated by the historically high propensity of euro are member countries to trade amongst each other. In fact, Berger and Nitsch (2008) show that the common currency added little or nothing to the pre-existing trend of increasing trade intensity among euro area members. In a related strand of the literature, Ahearne and others (2007) and Schmitz and von Hagen (2009) observe the increased heterogeneity of intra-euro area current account and trade balances since 1999. There is also some evidence that the dispersion of euro area members' bilateral trade balances with other members exceeds the dispersion of their extra-area balances. That said, these differences seem to have been on an upward trend already prior to the euro's introduction. The European Commission (2009, 2010 ) also finds that current account dispersion has steadily since the early 1990s, reaching an "all-time high" in 2008. Similarly, Decressin and Stavrev (2009) diagnose an increase in the persistence of current account surpluses and deficits of euro area countries in excess of other advanced economies predating the euro. This suggests that the absence of flexible exchange rates may not be the only factor at play. This leads to another strand of the literature that discusses the influence of structural factors and the level and persistence of the current account. Conceptually, Blanchard (2007) shows that the structural characteristics and distortions of goods, labor, and financial markets will influence current accounts and could give rise to government interventions. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence pointing in this general direction. Schmitz and von Hagen (2009) confirm show that the integration of euro area financial markets reached a new level with the introduction of the common currency, paving the way for higher current account and trade imbalances.
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In particular, they show that the elasticity of within-area trade balances (their proxy for within-area net-capital flows) to per capita GDP has significantly increased with the introduction of the euro. In a related paper, Ca 'Zirzi and Rubaszek (2008) argue that expectations of real income convergence and consumption smoothing well explain the pattern of current account balances of euro area countries. According to Ju and Wei (2007) , labor market rigidities are another structural factor shaping current accounts across many countries: the less flexible labor markets are, the more protracted is the adjustment of current accounts to shocks toward their longer run equilibrium. The underlying reason is that these market rigidities slow the needed adjustment in the production structure between the tradables and the nontradables sector. Zemanak and others (2009) discuss links between various proxies of structural reforms and competitiveness within the euro area. Kennedy and Sløk (2005) highlight the connection between the persistence of current account imbalances and market rigidities more generally, but they also warn that it remains difficult to robustly establish a link between specific structural conditions and current account positions that is independent of idiosyncratic country conditions. Finally, another set of papers looks at the relationship of macroeconomic variables on the current and trade account. For example, the standard import demand model links the trade balance to the real exchange rate and income differences across countries (e.g., Goldstein and Khan, 1985) . In addition, Abbas and others (2010) , among others, show that fiscal adjustments impact the current account, in particular in emerging economies. And Mody and Ohnesorge (2010) and Fogli and Perri (2010) discuss the impact of business cycle volatility on savings and current account balances.
In what follows, we add to this literature along a number of dimensions. We focus exclusively on a sample of comparable European countries, only some of which have adopted a common currency, the euro. In addition, we take a detailed look at bilateral trade relations. This allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of exchange rate conditions on trade than the study of overall trade (or current account) balances, which reflect a multitude of bilateral exchange rate constellations. Finally, we use a comparatively long sample and a wide variety of settings to examine various potential determinants of trade imbalances.
III. Methodology and Data
Our variable of interest is the bilateral trade balance between a reporter country r and a partner country p, defined as the difference between r's exports to p and r's imports from p in a given year t. To account for differences in the importance of a trade relationship both across partners and over time, we normalize the trade surplus or deficit by the total value of bilateral trade:
consistently deviate from the sample average by adding pair-specific fixed effects {RP}. Finally, we replace the common time effects by country time fixed effects for both reporter {R} and partner {P} countries to capture any dynamic country-specific features that could affect the countries' overall trade position, such as general trends in country-specific competitiveness. Given the comprehensiveness of the set of fixed effects, this constitutes a fairly strong test of the hypothesis that euro area membership will influence the level of trade imbalances.
In a second exercise, we examine country-specific determinants of trade imbalances in more detail. In particular, we aim to identify country features that help explaining the occurrence of a surplus or deficit in bilateral trade. Our regressions take the following general form:
where Z is the variable of interest which is typically entered as the pair-wise difference in values between the reporter and partner country, thereby allowing the inclusion of an EMU interaction term that captures possible changes in the effect after the introduction of the euro as common currency.
In line with previous work on the effects of EMU (Berger and Nitsch, 2008) , our analysis focuses on a homogeneous set of 18 European countries. The approach has the advantage of including countries which either share the European Union's (EU) institutional framework or are closely associated with it. The sample comprises the 15 countries which were member of the EU at the time of the introduction of the euro (eleven of which adopted the currency from Since country r's trade balance with p is typically not identical to p's inversely-signed trade balance with r (e.g., because of different valuation methods for exports and imports), we decided to keep the full sample of bilateral imbalances. 4 Our trade data set is augmented with macroeconomic variables from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Institutional variables are taken from the OECD. Variables and sources are described in detail in an appendix. Figure 1 graphs the evolution of absolute trade imbalances in our sample over time. Two observations stand out. First, the sample average trade imbalance consistently exceeds the median imbalance, indicating that the distribution could be dominated by a few disproportionately large imbalances between country pairs. Indeed, some bilateral trade relationships are characterized by one-directional trade flows and, thus, high imbalances, especially for small countries (such as Iceland, Ireland, and Greece).
To analyze this issue in more detail, Figure 2 shows the trade balances of various groups of countries over the same period. Specifically, we distinguish between trade relationships for which exchange rates were fixed with the introduction of the euro (intra-EMU trade) and trade pairs for which nominal exchange rates remained flexible (i.e., trade between EMU countries and non-members as well as trade between non-members). Interestingly, the Ushaped pattern applies most strongly to trade between EMU member countries, while trade between non-members display no clear tendency over time. Trade imbalances between EMU member countries and non-members show a similar but less pronounced U-shape. A possible explanation could be that the external value of the euro, while flexible, was not sufficiently close to equilibrium for all euro area countries. Figure 3 illustrates that this could indeed be a (partial) explanation for this finding. The figure plots, separately for each EMU member country, the largest bilateral trade surplus and deficit with a non-member. For most countries, positive and negative imbalances have been increasing over the last few years.
IV. Trade Imbalances and Exchange Rate Regimes
The benchmark estimates presented in Table 1 suggest that the observed relationship between trade imbalances and the exchange rate regime stands up to more rigorous empirical analysis. We begin with the most parsimonious specification of equation (2), a regression of the absolute value of the bilateral trade imbalance on an EMU membership dummy and time effects, modelled as year dummies. As shown in column 1, the estimated  coefficient for the EMU variable is positive and statistically significant, supporting the observations in Section 3. The point estimate of about 0.018 implies that trade imbalances between EMU member countries are on average about 2 percentage points larger than in the rest of the sample. In column 2, we add a comprehensive set of pair-wise fixed effects so that the EMU variable now captures the time variation in the trade imbalance for EMU member countries after the adoption of the euro. The estimated coefficient not only remains positive and significant, but almost doubles in magnitude to 0.033. This suggests that EMU countries have experienced an increase in their within-euro area bilateral trade imbalances by an average of more than 3 percentage points since the adoption of the common currency, which looks large compared to a sample mean of about 0.3 percent. Controlling instead for time-variant country-specific features in the reporter and partner country leaves the estimation result basically unchanged. As shown in column 3, the estimate impact of EMU remains positive, significant, and economically sizable.
The last three columns of Table 1 further generalize these results. The regressions add an additional dummy variable indicating the presence of a fixed (or unchanged) exchange rate other than euro area membership, along with the p-value of a t-test for similarity of the estimated coefficients. While the estimates of the EMU effect on trade imbalances are unaffected by this extension, the coefficients for other fixed exchange rates vary strongly across specifications. The coefficient estimate is positive and significant when only common time fixed effects are included, reflecting the large imbalances in the immediate post-World War II period. After controlling for pair-wise fixed effects, the coefficient falls in magnitude and becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero; it even changes sign (but remains insignificant) for the specification with country time fixed effects.
To investigate the role of exchange rate flexibility a little further, Table 2 substitutes the simple binary approach taken above by two alternative measures of exchange rate volatility: the annual standard deviation of the monthly nominal exchange rate and a set of dummy variables indicating the degree of nominal exchange rate flexibility. For both measures, we report estimation results for the three now familiar regression specifications.
The standard deviation variable impacts bilateral trade balances, but the result depends on the model estimated. We find that bilateral imbalances are decreasing in nominal exchange rate variability in the specification including country-pair fixed effects and country time fixed effects, as shown in the third column of Table 2 . However, the effect turns positive in less parsimonious specifications, suggesting that controlling for time-variant country characteristics is important for the identification of the exchange rate effect. Note that the estimate of the EMU effect on trade imbalances remains largely unaffected by these perturbations.
Differentiating across different degrees of exchange rate flexibility provides little additional insights. The last three columns of Table 2 introduce a set of additional dummy variables indicating different levels of nominal exchange volatility, making the omitted category a fixed exchange rate other than the use of the euro. In the regression with only common time fixed effects, all estimated coefficients take a negative sign, which could indicate that the largest (average) imbalances could have occurred during non-EMU episodes of fixed exchange rates. It is also interesting to note that, excluding country-pair within the euro area, imbalances seem to have been smaller for country pairs witnessing relatively larger exchange rate movements on average. However, this pattern is not robust to the introduction of country-pair and country time fixed effects.
V. Determinants of Bilateral Trade Surpluses/Deficits
Moving from the level of bilateral trade imbalances to their direction, we take a closer look at the determinants of trade surpluses and deficits. We estimate variants of equation (3), varying the set of fixed effects in line with the economic or fiscal variables introduced.
We begin by exploring macroeconomic variables that are potentially associated with the emergence of bilateral trade imbalances. According to standard models of import demand and supply, the trade balance is a function of relative prices as well as domestic and foreign expenditure. We proxy for these variables with a bilateral index of the real exchange rate, computed as RER rpt = ER prt × CPI rt / CPI pt , where ER denotes the nominal exchange rate and CPI is the consumer price index, and the difference in real GDP growth rates. Larger values of the (lagged) exchange rate index, implying a real appreciation of the reporter's currency, should then be associated with a deterioration of the trade balance. The impact of relative growth depends on the demand and supply elasticities, but generally a positive growth differential should be associated with a lower bilateral trade surplus or higher deficit.
Trade surpluses and deficits tend to deteriorate with real appreciations, in particular in the presence of fixed nominal exchange rates. As shown in columns one to five in Table 3 , the estimated coefficient for the (log of the) real exchange rate takes the expected negative sign and is highly significant for the periods with mostly fixed exchange rates, namely under the Bretton Woods system 1949 to 1973 and the period 1999 to 2009 that covers the euro's reign in our sample. We find a similar result between 1973 and the mid-1980s, when the so-called "currency snake" arrangement kept nominal exchange rate swings in check among many European countries. The estimated impact is broadly similar and large across these subperiods, suggesting that a one percent increase in the real exchange rate leads to a reduction in the trade balance of about 4 to 5 percentage points. Only during the years 1984 to 1998, which roughly centers around the 1992 European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis, the real exchange rate shows an unexpected positive impact, which also seems to be driving the outcome over the full period. In another perturbation, we replace the time-varying fixed effects by real effective exchange rate indices for both the exporting and the importing country (available only for a shorter time period). Reassuringly, there is again strong evidence that a decline in price competitiveness due to a real exchange rate appreciation is associated with a worsening of the trade balance.
The final two columns of Table 3 show that higher relative real GDP growth is linked to lower bilateral trade surpluses or higher deficits. Column seven tabulates results for the full sample, along with an interaction term for growth differentials among countries that use the euro as national currency; and column eight presents analogue findings for a reduced sample of EMU member countries after the introduction of the euro. While the full-sample effects are statistically weak, the results suggest that EMU members growing faster than their trade partners suffer deterioration of their bilateral trade balance and vice versa. Both the coefficient on the interaction term and the coefficient of the growth differential in the EMUonly subsample are negative. Looking at the euro area sample, the effect is economically sizable: an increase in a country's growth advantage by one percent is associated with a decrease in its bilateral trade balance by about 5 percentage points. This is likely to reflect the sizable trade deficits of some of the faster growing member states after the introduction of the euro. Table 4 provides evidence that trade surpluses tend to increase in a measure of business cycle volatility. The work by Mody and Ohnesorge (2010) suggests that an increase in business cycle volatility leads to higher precautionary household savings, which, by extension, should be associated with higher trade balance surpluses or lower trade balance deficits. We explore this hypothesis in the first two columns of the table, using the standard deviation of annual real GDP growth rates over a centered 9-year period as proxy for business cycle volatility. The positive coefficient estimates indeed imply that countries with relatively lower growth volatility tend to exhibit lower trade surpluses or higher deficits, an effect that is amplified for EMU member countries. The impact is nonnegligible in magnitude, with a one-standarddeviation increase in relative growth volatility associated with an increase in the trade balance by about 9 percentage points.
We also find evidence for the argument that higher trade balance deficits tend to occur in conjunction with higher fiscal deficits (e.g., Abbas and others, 2010) . The findings in Table 4 provide strong support for the "twin deficit" hypothesis. Again, the effect is particularly pronounced for trade pairs in which both partner countries use the euro. The quantitative impact tends to be large: among euro area members, a one percentage point increase in the (relative) fiscal balance tends to occur along an improvement in the trade balance by two percentage points.
Finally, we show that market flexibility is associated with a more favorable trade balance-a link stressed by Blanchard (2007) and others. The analysis makes use of OECD indicators proxying the intensity of various aspects of product and labor market regulation by indices ranging from from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions). Figure 4 illustrates that higher levels of these indicators are associated with lower bilateral trade imbalances both across country pairs and over time. For a more rigorous analysis, Table 5 tabulates, for each indicator, estimation results from a regression covering the full country sample and a sample reduced to only EMU countries during the euro years. As usual, in the full sample, we interact the variable of interest with the EMU dummy. Note that the availability of the institutional indicators severely limits the number of observations in a number of cases.
That said, the bulk of the econometric evidence suggests that higher relative levels of regulation are indeed associated with lower trade balance surpluses or higher deficits.
Specifically, we find that bilateral trade balances tend to be significantly lower when the relative levels of overall labor market and product market rigidity in a country are higher than in the partner country, an effect that is particularly strong among euro area members. The link is somewhat less clear for the subindices that focus on particular aspect of regulation. Still, the majority of subindices also show a negative impact, especially for EMU member countries.
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VI. Persistence of Bilateral Trade Imbalances
In a final set of exercises, we ask whether the rate of persistence of trade account imbalances-that is, the speed with which imbalances revert to equilibrium after a shock-is affected by the degree of exchange rate stability.
In a first step, we establish that the disproportionately large bilateral trade imbalances under EMU are mainly the result of greater persistence of these imbalances between EMU member countries. The first model reported in Table 6 augments the baseline model of Table 1 by adding lagged values of the dependent variable as well as an interaction term that captures the effect of lagged imbalances in the euro area. We find strong evidence of persistence; the autoregressive coefficient is about 0.68 and highly statistically significant. However, the degree of persistence is much higher for EMU countries: when the lagged dependent variable is interacted with EMU membership, the estimated coefficient is positive, highly statistically significant, and economically large. The degree of persistence of intra-euro area imbalances is about 25 percent higher than elsewhere, implying an autoregressive coefficient of about 0.83 for EMU members. At the same time, the non-interacted EMU dummy does take on a negative value. 8 Column two shows that the result does not extend to other fixed exchange rates. The remainder of Table 6 reports analogous estimation results for regressions in which the absolute value of the trade imbalance is replaced by the trade surplus and deficit as dependent variable.
Some of the higher persistence of trade imbalances can be linked to market institutions for EMU countries. The first three columns of Table 7 tabulate results for the average level of employment protection for a given pair of countries, the last three columns focus on the average level of product market regulation. While the results indicate no significant relationship between the level of persistence and regulation overall (see rows three and seven for the relevant interaction terms), there are indications that higher levels of employment protection tend to be associated with higher levels of trade imbalances persistence among euro area countries (see row three). Based on the completely specified model in column three, the autoregressive coefficient increases by about 0.09 for each unit increase in the OECD indicator ranging from 1 to 6. This suggest that, after adoption of the euro, EMU countries with more rigid labor market institutions exhibited statistically and economically significantly lower rates of reversion in their trade account imbalances. For instance, a reduction of employment protection levels from the sample mean of 2.4 to the sample low of 0.8 wouldall other things equal-reduce the persistence from the euro area sample average by about 0.15. This is equivalent to the difference between the degree of persistence in our sample overall and the higher persistence observed among EMU countries (see the discussion of Table 6 ).
VII. Conclusion
Our results indicate that imbalances in trade among euro area members are significantly larger than among other countries or between euro area members and others. Much of the difference is due to a higher degree of persistence of these imbalances, which lengthens the impact of shocks. This is in line with the observations that imbalances tend to be lower among trade partners with a highly volatile nominal exchange rate and that bilateral trade surpluses are decreasing in the real exchange rate, which will move more slowly in the absence of nominal exchange rate flexibility.
Even though bilateral trade relationships need not necessarily be balanced, the emergence of large and persistent trade imbalances could indicate underlying policy tensions or rigidities. Here our results confirm that policy and market institutions play a role: some of the higher intra-euro area persistence in trade imbalances is associated with high levels of employment protection, and bilateral trade deficits tend to be higher among countries with higher levels of labor and product markets rigidities. Moreover, trade surpluses are higher in countries that have relatively volatile economies (and high buffer savings) and low fiscal deficits.
These findings are both bad and good news to policymakers. The bad news is that irrevocably fixed nominal exchange rates do come at the cost of larger and more permanent trade imbalances, just as Friedman (1953) claimed more than half a century ago. The good news is that these imbalances are not cast in stone. On past form, trade imbalances are lower and their adjustment to shocks is faster in economies characterized by more flexible labor markets. Structural reforms that smooth the business cycle, for example by increasing growth contributions from domestic sources in very open trade surplus economies, can help reduce precautionary savings and reduce trade surpluses. Finally, measures to improve the fiscal balance are likely to aid efforts to reduce large deficits in trade. Notes: Filled circles mark country pairs where both partners are/become EMU members. Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the absolute trade imbalance as a fraction of total bilateral trade. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Year-specific reporter and partner fixed effects and time-invariant pair-wise fixed effects are always included, but not reported.
